Britcon Demo Games
Each year at Britcon we play host to a number of impressive demo games alongside the competitions and trade show. This year is no exception, and on the list so far we have a number of confirmed demos.
If you or your club would like to spend the weekend gaming on a huge (or small!) table and chatting to our visitors, please get in touch and we will do our best to accommodate you. As a demo player/club you can take advantage of our Student-priced accommodation offers and onsite student-priced bar as well!
If you or your club would like to spend the weekend gaming on a huge (or small!) table and chatting to our visitors, please get in touch and we will do our best to accommodate you. As a demo player/club you can take advantage of our Student-priced accommodation offers and onsite student-priced bar as well!
Confirmed Demo Games so far:
Mailed Fist - Abbeville, WW2
The Battle of Abbeville took place from 27 May to 4 June 1940, near Abbeville during the Battle of France in the Second World War. On 20 May, the 2nd Panzer Division advanced 56 miles (90 km) to Abbeville on the English Channel, overran the 25th Infantry Brigade of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and captured the town at 8:30 p.m. Only a few British survivors managed to retreat to the south bank of the Somme and at 2:00 a.m. on 21 May, the III Battalion, Rifle Regiment 2 reached the coast, west of Noyelles-sur-Mer.
The 1st Armoured Division (Major-General Roger Evans) arrived in France from 15 May without artillery, short of an armoured regiment and the infantry of the 1st Support Group, which had been diverted to Calais. From 27 May – 4 June, the Franco-British forces south of the Abbeville bridgehead, held by the 2nd Panzer Division, then the 57th Infantry Division, recaptured about half of the area; the Allied forces lost many of their tanks and the Germans much of their infantry, some units running back over the River Somme. On 5 June, the divisions of the German 4th Army attacked out of the bridgeheads south of the Somme and the Franco-British divisions opposite, which had been much depleted by their counter-attacks, were pushed back to the Bresle with many casualties.
In 1953, the British official historian, L. F. Ellis wrote that the Allies lacked battlefield co-ordination, which contributed to the Allied failure to defeat the Germans and magnified the cost of lack of preparation and underestimation of the German defences south of the Somme. In 2001, Caddick-Adams also wrote of the chronic lack of battlefield communication within and between the British and French divisions, which was caused by a shortage of radios and led to elementary and costly tactical errors. The lack of communication continued after reinforcement by the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division (Major-General Victor Fortune) and French armoured and infantry divisions. The Germans had committed substantial forces to the bridgeheads, despite the operations in the north, that culminated in the Dunkirk evacuation from (26 May – 3 June). The Somme crossings at Abbeville and elsewhere were still available on 5 June, for Fall Rot (Case Red), the final German offensive, which brought about the defeat of France
The 1st Armoured Division (Major-General Roger Evans) arrived in France from 15 May without artillery, short of an armoured regiment and the infantry of the 1st Support Group, which had been diverted to Calais. From 27 May – 4 June, the Franco-British forces south of the Abbeville bridgehead, held by the 2nd Panzer Division, then the 57th Infantry Division, recaptured about half of the area; the Allied forces lost many of their tanks and the Germans much of their infantry, some units running back over the River Somme. On 5 June, the divisions of the German 4th Army attacked out of the bridgeheads south of the Somme and the Franco-British divisions opposite, which had been much depleted by their counter-attacks, were pushed back to the Bresle with many casualties.
In 1953, the British official historian, L. F. Ellis wrote that the Allies lacked battlefield co-ordination, which contributed to the Allied failure to defeat the Germans and magnified the cost of lack of preparation and underestimation of the German defences south of the Somme. In 2001, Caddick-Adams also wrote of the chronic lack of battlefield communication within and between the British and French divisions, which was caused by a shortage of radios and led to elementary and costly tactical errors. The lack of communication continued after reinforcement by the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division (Major-General Victor Fortune) and French armoured and infantry divisions. The Germans had committed substantial forces to the bridgeheads, despite the operations in the north, that culminated in the Dunkirk evacuation from (26 May – 3 June). The Somme crossings at Abbeville and elsewhere were still available on 5 June, for Fall Rot (Case Red), the final German offensive, which brought about the defeat of France
